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Introduction 
The  35 papers presented at this year’s meeting can be broadly grouped into ﬁ  ve topics: 
foundations, which involves work on relatively deep issues in monetary theory; central 
banking and monetary policy, which concerns applied issues more or less directly re-
lated to policy making; ﬁ  scal and monetary policy, which involves the interconnections 
between these two types of policy; ﬁ  nancial intermediation and banking, which is con-
cerned with intermediation in general and especially the roles of banks; and money and 
bonds, which considers the relation between two particular assets and asks how they in-
teract.  
Foundations
Quasilinear preferences are very convenient in several ﬁ  elds of economics, but especially 
in modern monetary economics. In “Stationarity and Degeneracy in a Commodity Money 
Model,” Ricardo Cavalcanti and Daniela Puzzello take a step toward a better understand-
ing of the role of quasilinearity by examining the implications of these preferences for 
optimal allocations in a theoretic analysis of an economy with commodity money. In the 
ﬁ  rst stage, agents are randomly matched, with exogenous probabilities they are either 
producers or consumers in that match, and they then make decisions on whether or not 
to trade. In the second stage, agents part and decide to produce and consume a different 
(storable) good that can act as commodity money, although the storage technology is sub-
ject to shocks. Cavalcanti and Puzzello take an implementability approach: They ﬁ  nd that 
the planner’s problem can be reduced to a sequence of very simple (essentially static) 
problems. They also show that the distribution of money may or may not be degenerate, 
and that allowing buyers to make take-it-or-leave-it others is optimal. Quasilinearity is the 
key to these results. The approach can be extended to more complex environments, and 
hence the tools they develop may prove quite generally applicable.  
In “Competing Auctions in a Monetary Economy,” Richard Dutu, Benoit Julien, and 
Ian King consider an economy where goods are allocated by ascending bid auctions, 
and sellers compete for buyers through the reserve price of their auction. The environ-
ment has several novel and interesting features. First, sellers decide on the quantity of 
the good to be auctioned. There is a trade-off for sellers between production costs and 
the expected number of buyers they attract. Also, sellers compete in both the posted 
quantity and the reserve price. Buyers choose how much money to bring to the market, 
which implies a trade-off between the cost of holding money and the expected gain 
from winning an auction. The model predicts that inﬂ  ation cannot be too low or too 
high for a monetary equilibrium to exist and that increasing inﬂ  ation decreases the equi-
librium-posted quantity and the number of buyers. Efﬁ  ciency is attained for the lowest 
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possible inﬂ  ation rate that is compatible with the existence of monetary equilibrium. 
This kind of work greatly extends our understanding of monetary economies because it 
shows how alternative mechanisms like auctions (and unlike bargaining or price post-
ing, for example, as in most previous work) can be incorporated. 
In “Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design,” Ricardo Cavalcanti and Ed 
Nosal describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money that  is difﬁ  cult 
to monitor. Their approach, which extends the basic random- matching model of money, 
allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. They show that it is not ef-
ﬁ  cient to eliminate counterfeiting completely, and argue that their model is consistent 
with the idea of imperfect monitoring. This kind of analysis aids our understanding of 
how money may work when it is possible to cheat the system by counterfeiting. 
In “On the Uniqueness of Steady State Monetary Equilibrium in the Alternating Mar-
ket Model of Money,” Randall Wright does the following. First, he presents a model that 
generalizes the one in Lagos and Wright, which is a very tractable framework for mon-
etary theory and policy analysis, based on quasilinear preferences. Then he clears up the 
following loose end in previous analyses of these kinds of models: previously, only un-
der rather severe conditions on bargaining or nonstandard assumptions on preferences 
and technology has it been known that a unique monetary steady state exists. Wright 
proves uniqueness without any conditions on bargaining or nonstandard assumptions 
on primitives. This is very useful, since many people are currently using the framework, 
and they have been previously forced to present only an incomplete characterization 
of steady states. Now one can say in these papers that the equilibrium being analyzed is 
unique. As a corollary, it is shown that the model implies monotone comparative statics 
for a wide class of parameter changes. 
In “A Hotelling Model with Money,” Dean Corbae and Borghan Narajabad study how 
tastes and technology simultaneously determine product variety and the choice of ex-
change mechanism (e.g., money versus barter). They study the interaction between the 
exchange mechanism and product variety. The novel part of the analysis follows from the 
observation that the addition of more barter shops substitute for one another while the 
addition of more money shops actually complement one another. They solve for optimal 
incentive feasible allocations and implement the solution as a trading post economy. 
In “One Money or Two Monies?” Mei Dong and Janet Hua Jiang show that having two 
monies (instead of just one) improves welfare in an environment with private informa-
tion. They use a version of the Lagos-Wright model, where activities in each period oc-
cur over two sequential stages characterized by ﬁ  rst centralized and then decentralized 
trade. At the beginning of each period, agents possess two layers of private informa-
tion, which pertains to probability distributions over their taste and technology param-
eters. Agents sort themselves by choosing different monies before the realization of the 
shocks. The existence of a second money improves welfare because the sorting relaxes 
  Counterfeiting as Private 
Money in Mechanism Design
  Ricardo Cavalcanti and 
Ed Nosal
  On the Uniqueness of Steady 
State Monetary Equilibrium in 
the Alternating Market Model 
of Money
 Randall  Wright 
  A Hotelling Model with Money
  Dean Corbae and 
Borghan Narajabad
One Money or Two Monies?
Mei Dong and Janet Hua JiangFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
3
incentive-compatibility constraints associated with the private information about the 
taste parameter. This kind of theory greatly enhances our understanding of the kinds of 
institutions that work well under various types of frictions, including private informa-
tion. 
In “Markets and Relationships in a Learning Economy,” Luis Araujo and Raoul Minetti 
pursue a new explanation for the determination of market structure. Generally speaking, 
one can think of two basic structures under which exchange occurs. In one—transac-
tions-based—agents engage in spot trades, and frequently break matches with current 
partners to match with new ones. In another—relationship-based—agents repeatedly 
exchange within a match. In many markets, some exchanges occur in each mode. The 
empirical structure of market exchange exhibits sharp cross-country variation, and it 
is sometimes argued that variations in the structure of markets can help explain cross-
country differences in economic performance. Araujo and Minetti study the structure 
of the credit market that arises when agents must learn about aggregate productivity 
from market exchange. This kind of model allows one to relate credit market structure 
to macroeconomic fundamentals, such as the persistence and volatility of aggregate pro-
ductivity, and hence may ultimately be useful for empirical or policy analysis. 
Central Banking and Monetary Policy
Economists working in the area of monetary theory and policy have had two goals. They 
have tried to formulate models of monetary policy in which money (currency) has a well-
understood role. And they have hoped to ﬁ  nd that optimal policy is guided by simple 
principles that are not too dependent on details of the model. 
In “Optimal Central-Bank Intervention: An Example,” Alexei Deviatov and Neil Wal-
lace study optimal policy in an example that satisﬁ  es the ﬁ  rst goal but not the second. 
The ingredients of the example are: (i) heterogeneity in the degree to which different 
people are monitored; (ii) idiosyncratic shocks that give rise to heterogeneity in earning 
and spending realizations; and (iii) central-bank intervention in a credit market in which 
the participants are those who are heavily monitored. Ingredient (i)—the existence of 
people who are hardly monitored—gives rise to a role for money: those who are hardly 
monitored cannot get credit. The combination of (i) and (ii) produces the following 
problem: the hardly monitored are at times liquidity constrained, and at other times, 
they have so much liquidity that they have little incentive to earn more. Finally, (iii) im-
plies that the connection between central-bank intervention and the liquidity problem 
is indirect because those who are hardly monitored are not participants in the market 
in claims. That accounts for why the example does not satisfy the second goal. Although 
(i)-(iii) are not controversial, there is no other analysis of optimal policy in the literature 
that rests on those ingredients. There are several reasons. First, only recently have models 
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been formulated that augment (ii) with ingredients (i) and (iii). Second, because most 
models of central-bank intervention do not satisfy the ﬁ  rst goal, the idea that central-
bank activity should be geared to solving the economic problem implied by (i) and (ii) 
is not widely accepted. But perhaps it ought to be. Central banks have a monopoly on 
money. If money has a role because some people are imperfectly monitored, then it 
is not far-fetched to suggest that management of that monopoly should be directed at 
something closely related to what makes money important. Moreover, recall that central 
banks in several countries emerged as legally mandated monopoly issuers of banknotes 
from systems in which there were originally many private banks issuing notes. Given 
such a monopoly, there is a role for two arrangements that partially substitute for private 
note issue: trade in claims among the would-be issuers of private banknotes (something 
like a credit market); and central-bank participation in such trade. The model in this pa-
per includes versions of those arrangements. 
In “Adverse Selection and the Role of Monetary Policy,” Daniel Sanches and Steve Wil-
liamson discuss the following issue. When agents engage in monetary exchange, they 
may be imperfectly informed about the future trading opportunities of their trading 
partners. This creates an inefﬁ  ciency relative to full information, and policy can poten-
tially correct this distortion. Sanches and Williamson, following Lagos and Wright, assume 
agents alternate between centralized and decentralized exchange. However, centralized 
markets are segmented and, as a result, the value of money will be different in each 
location. In decentralized exchange, agents are bilaterally matched and contracts are 
distorted due to private information. When the central bank is able to intervene in both 
locations, the Friedman rule can correct all frictions. When ﬁ  nancial trade is allowed 
across locations in the centralized market, prices are 4 equalized and the Friedman rule 
can again work. However, when the central bank is constrained to intervene in only one 
location, the Friedman rule is in general not feasible and it is not generally possible to 
eliminate the frictions entirely. 
In “Public Information and Monetary Policy,” Marie Hoerova, Cyril Monnet, and Ted 
Temzelides study monetary policy in a model where uncertainty can lead to a discrep-
ancy between agents’ beliefs and true fundamentals. Following the work of Morris and 
Shin, the key feature is that investment decisions are subject to a “beauty contest” ele-
ment: additional consumption is more beneﬁ  cial if other agents also consume more 
of the good. The model departs from Morris and Shin’s static approach by introducing 
an inﬁ  nite time horizon and making money essential. The spatial separation of agents 
prevents prices from being fully revealing, and allows the authors to study the interplay 
between monetary and informational frictions. A central assumption in the model is that 
monetary policy is the only way for the central bank to credibly transmit its information 
about fundamentals. The model offers an information-based argument for the idea that 
higher nominal rate hikes occur less frequently than lower ones. 
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In “Central Bank Design with Heterogeneous Agents,” Aleksander Berentsen and Car-
lo Strub study alternative decision-making models for the determination of monetary 
policy. They consider a model where agents have either a high or a low utility from 
consumption. The main consequence of this heterogeneity is that there is a two-point 
distribution of money holdings and, therefore, monetary policy has redistributive effects. 
Simple majority voting, supermajority voting, a policy board, and other mechanisms for 
determining policy are compared. The social planner’s desired policy is the Friedman 
rule. This can be attained if, under simple majority voting, the agents with low-inﬂ  ation 
preferences have the majority. Under bargaining, the ﬁ  rst-best can only be attained when 
transfers are feasible. Under all other central bank designs the equilibrium outcome does 
not attain the ﬁ  rst-best. One interesting result is that when there are two separate econo-
mies, one populated by agents with low preferences for consumption and the other by 
agents with high preferences for consumption, each prefers the Friedman rule. If these 
two economies form a monetary union, however, then a deviation from the Friedman 
rule can occur. 
In “Uncertainty, Inﬂ  ation and Welfare,” Jonathan Chiu and Miguel Molico study the 
costs and the redistributive effects of inﬂ  ation in the presence of partially-insurable id-
iosyncratic risk. Building on Lagos and Wright, the model emphasizes two empirically 
plausible features. First, economic agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding pro-
ductivity, preferences, and trading opportunities. Second, agents are unable to fully in-
sure against such risk. These features introduce a technical challenge, since to solve the 
model, one must keep track of the distribution of money holdings (note they generalize 
the standard model by relaxing the assumption of quasilinear preferences). The model 
is calibrated and solved computationally. They ﬁ  nd that the long-run welfare costs of 
low and moderate inﬂ  ations are on average 40% smaller than predicted by a complete-
market model. This style of work greatly enhances 5 the class of models we can study by 
showing how to solve much more complicated environments that we usually analyze 
on the computer. 
In “Elastic Money, Inﬂ  ation, and Interest Rate Policy,” Allen Head and Junfeng Qiu study 
optimal monetary policy in an environment where aggregate shocks affect individual 
agents asymmetrically, and exchange may be conducted using either bank deposits (in-
side money) or ﬁ  at currency (outside money). By controlling interest rates, the monetary 
authority can affect the price level and consumption, thus providing insurance against 
unfavorable shocks. The paper thus links two principal components of monetary policy: 
an interest-rate-based stabilization policy and an optimal long-run inﬂ  ation rate. Assum-
ing aggregate shocks affect agents differently, the inability of some agents to perfectly 
insure generates an essential role for money and opens up the possibility that monetary 
policy may improve welfare. Under the optimal policy, the central bank, together with 
the private banking system, may help insure against unanticipated shocks. 
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In “The Optimal Inﬂ  ation Target in an Economy with Limited Enforcement,” Gaetano 
Antinol., Costas Azariadis, and James Bullard formulate the central bank’s problem of 
selecting an optimal long-run inﬂ  ation rate as the choice of a distorting tax. Households 
are divided into cash agents who store value in currency alone, and credit agents who 
have access to both currency and loans. The planner’s problem is equivalent to choosing 
inﬂ  ation and nominal rates consistent with a resource constraint, along with an incen-
tive constraint that ensures credit agents do not default on obligations. In this environ-
ment, deﬂ  ation may not be feasible since it subsidizes currency at the expense of loans, 
leading credit agents to default. An inﬂ  ation rate higher than the minimum required 
to slacken debt constraints is equivalent to a distortionary income transfer from cash 
agents to credit agents. With a little imagination, one can potentially interpret these ﬁ  nd-
ings as consistent with the “comfort zones” articulated by some central banks. 
In “Information Aggregation and Central Bank Communication,” Pierre-Olivier Weil 
and Manuel Amador consider a monetary economy with no explicit microfoundations 
(they use a cash-in-advance constraint), but model carefully uncertainty about the val-
ue of aggregate productivity. Information is initially dispersed among households, and 
households learn by observing the distribution of nominal prices. This distribution, how-
ever, will not fully reveal productivity because prices are affected by the unknown level 
of the money supply. When the central bank discloses information about money, it has a 
direct beneﬁ  cial effect since households can extract more information about productivi-
ty. But there is also a countervailing effect: after an announcement, households rely more 
on public and less on private information, and this tends to reduce the informational 
content of prices. It is shown show that, in some circumstances, a policy announcement 
can reduce welfare. Whether this is empirically relevant in practice is an open issue, but 
it is important to see how these kinds of effects can arise in principle. 
High-inﬂ  ation economies often experience reductions in quantity and variety in the 
marketplace. Previous models explain the ﬁ  rst phenomenon, but not the second. In 
“Inﬂ  ation and Variety,” Mei Dong endogenizes the effect of inﬂ  ation on both quantity 
and variety. Two market structures for decentralized trade are considered: bargaining 
and competitive search. For both market structures, inﬂ  ation reduces quantity per trade 
and variety. The bargaining outcome entails a double holdup problem, since ﬁ  rms make 
ex ante investments in variety, and consumers make ex ante investments before being 
matched. The terms of trade are generally inefﬁ  cient due to both the inﬂ  ation and bar-
gaining distortions. The Friedman rule is the optimal policy but is unable to achieve si-
multaneously the efﬁ  cient quantity and variety under bargaining. In contrast, in competi-
tive search equilibrium the Friedman rule achieves the efﬁ  cient allocation. The model is 
calibrated and used to measure how much of the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation can be traced 
back to a reduction of variety, and how much to a reduction in quantity. 
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In “Welfare-Improving Departures from the Friedman Rule,” Ed Nosal discusses the fol-
lowing. If a departure from the Friedman rule is to be socially optimal, there must exist 
some kind of counterbalancing beneﬁ  t associated with holding a non-interest-bearing 
asset. The literature has offered some potential beneﬁ  ts. Nosal identiﬁ  es a new avenue. 
The basic idea is that if there an option value associated with putting off the purchase 
of certain kinds of goods, then individuals may be “too choosy” when purchasing these 
goods. For example, individuals may spend too much time shopping for an illiquid du-
rable, such as a used car, in hopes of ﬁ  nding a better car tomorrow. Since it is costly to 
hold money, a non-zero interest rate will make people less choosy in terms of the goods 
that they purchase, and this, in turn, can increase social welfare.
Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
In models of monetary exchange, where prices are determined by bargaining, output 
tends to be too low. The introduction of production subsidies is, therefore, a natural idea. 
In “Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a Search-Theoretic Model of Monetary Ex-
change,” Pere Gomis-Porqueras and Adrian Peralta-Alva investigate whether sales taxes 
and production subsidies, in conjunction with a monetary policy, can restore efﬁ  cien-
cy. They ﬁ  nd production subsidies, and taxes are able to improve the allocation. There 
are multiple combinations of taxes, subsidies and (sometimes strictly positive) inﬂ  ation 
rates that yield efﬁ  ciency. When government expenditures are positive, the optimal policy 
must trade off inﬂ  ation with tax distortions. Although the efﬁ  cient allocation cannot be 
achieved in this case, there are large welfare gains associated with having good ﬁ  scal and 
monetary policies in place. 
When there is a trade-off between the number of transactions (the extensive margin) 
and the quantity of goods exchanged in each trade (the intensive margin), the Friedman 
rule may be suboptimal. However, if the government has additional instruments, such as 
those associated with ﬁ  scal policy, the optimality of the Friedman rule may be restored. 
In “The Optimum Quantity of Money Revisited: Distortionary Taxation in a Search Model 
of Money,” by Moritz Ritter, a distortionary tax is introduced into a monetary search mod-
el. The introduction of an additional policy instrument does not resurrect the optimality 
of the Friedman rule, since inﬂ  ation plays a special role in altering agents’ search deci-
sions. Deviating from the Friedman rule also increases the effectiveness of sales taxes, 
because an increase in the tax tightens an already binding money constraint. 
A growing body of evidence suggests that ongoing relationships between consum-
ers and ﬁ  rms may be important for understanding price dynamics. In “Optimal Fiscal 
and Monetary Policy in Consumer Markets,” David Arseneau and Sanjay Chugh investi-
gate whether the existence of such customer relationships has important consequences 
for the conduct of long-run and short-run policy. They explore this question using the 
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Ramsey framework of optimal policy, in the tradition of Lucas and Stokey. A central re-
sult is this: when consumers and ﬁ  rms are engaged in long-term relationships, optimal 
inﬂ  ation volatility is very low even though all prices are completely ﬂ  exible. This ﬁ  nd-
ing contrasts with the standard perception from Ramsey models based on Walrasian 
markets. Echoing the basic intuition of models based on sticky prices, unanticipated 
inﬂ  ation in Arseneau and Chugh’s environment causes a type of relative price distortion, 
which stems from fundamental trading frictions that give rise to long-lived customer 
relationships. All of this research shows it can be very important to consider how ﬁ  scal 
and monetary policies interact and hence ought not be studied only in isolation. 
Financial Intermediation and Banking 
In “Financial Deepening, Inﬂ  ation, and Economic Growth,” Aleksander Berentsen and 
Shouyong Shi develop a general equilibrium framework to analyze the relationship be-
tween the operation of the ﬁ  nancial system, monetary policy, and growth. The ﬁ  nancial 
sector, the innovation sector, and the production sector compete for labor. Hence, chang-
es in policy affect the allocation of time and therefore growth. They ﬁ  rst investigate the 
dynamic interactions between ﬁ  nancial development and growth by analyzing how ﬁ  -
nancial innovation affects growth, and, in turn, how growth affects the ﬁ  nancial system. 
They then study how inﬂ  ation affects ﬁ  nancial deepening and growth. They calibrate 
their model to U.S. data, and perform two quantitative experiments. First, they measure 
the welfare gains that arise from an exogenous reduction of the cost of intermediation. 
Second, they assess the welfare effects of a permanent reduction of the inﬂ  ation rate. A 
number of empirical studies suggest that excessive inﬂ  ation, even if anticipated, impairs 
the performance of ﬁ  nancial markets. Researchers have highlighted three regularities: 
there is cross-section evidence of a negative association between long-run inﬂ  ation and 
ﬁ  nancial activities; the marginal impact of inﬂ  ation diminishes rapidly; and there is a dis-
crete drop in activity at high inﬂ  ation levels. 
In “Inﬂ  ation and Intermediation Frictions,” Gabriele Camera presents a theory of the 
inﬂ  ation–ﬁ  nance relationship, whose predictions are consistent with these observa-
tions. He adds intermediation to the Lagos and Wright model of money. Some features of 
his model are: cash is needed to support trade on input and output markets; producers 
need short-term credit for working capital; and intermediation is costly. He shows how 
inﬂ  ation, even at modest levels, can degrade the asset transformation process performed 
by ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, which can disrupt ﬁ  nancial and real activities if inﬂ  ation is 
high. 
In “Banks, Liquidity Insurance, and Interest on Reserves in a Matching Model of Mon-
ey,” Valerie Bencivenga and Gabriele Camera introduce banks as in Diamond-Dybvig into 
Lagos-Wright. Each period, an agent experiences a private shock before entering the 
decentralized market, which determines if he is a buyer or a seller, and if he is a buyer, 
 Financial  Deepening, 
Inﬂ  ation, and Economic 
Growth
  Aleksander Berentsen and 
Shouyong Shi
  Banks, Liquidity Insurance, 
and Interest on Reserves in 
a Matching Model of Money
  Valerie Bencivenga and 
Gabriele Camera
 Inﬂ  ation and Intermediation 
Frictions
 Gabriele  Camera FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
9
whether marginal utility is high or low. A bank is a coalition of agents that accepts depos-
its in the centralized market, holds some reserves of cash to meet withdrawal demand 
in the decentralized market, and invests the rest. Agents alter their money holdings by 
making withdrawals in the decentralized market at a ﬁ  xed cost. Since banks cannot ob-
serve the realization of the shocks, bank contracts must be incentive compatible. Banks 
improve welfare if the cost of withdrawals is not too large. When the cost is small the 
optimal deposit contract allows agents to achieve the allocation in the decentralized 
market they would have chosen if they had known the realization of shock prior to 
choosing their asset position. 
In “The Venture Capital Cycle,” Rafael Silviera and Randall Wright propose a model 
of private equity, which builds on recent developments in search theory. First they de-
scribe how the venture capital market is in reality characterized by the following cycle: 
(i) ﬁ  rst capitalists raise funds; (ii) capitalists and entrepreneurs match over time, and 
decisions are made as to which projects get funding; (iii) after matching, both parties 
take active roles in implementation; (iv) when eventually a project matures, capitalists 
take their proﬁ  ts and leave to start the cycle anew. The authors model this rigorously yet 
with an eye toward a realistic description of institutional details. They analyze various 
margins, including entry by capitalists, the ﬂ  ow of funds into the market, the decisions 
to start new ventures, and investment in the project during implementation. They study 
the duration of each phase in the cycle and the returns to the parties. The model is trac-
table, and it is easy to prove strong results concerning existence, comparative statics, etc. 
The implications for policy on this market are discussed. This is part of a large recent 
body of research trying to integrate ﬁ  nance with search-theoretic models in macro and 
monetary economics. 
Jonathan Chiu and Cesaire Meh, in “Banking, Liquidity and Inﬂ  ation,” extend the analy-
sis of Silviera and Wright by considering the role that ﬁ  nancial intermediaries may play 
in the funding of projects. They show that ﬁ  nancial intermediation improves the alloca-
tion but the welfare effects depend on monetary policy. For low inﬂ  ation, intermediation 
is not useful; for moderate inﬂ  ation rates, it is useful to individuals but actually reduces 
aggregate welfare; and for high inﬂ  ation intermediation improves aggregate welfare. Ab-
sent ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, capitalists need to bring liquidity to the market to purchase 
ideas for new projects. Since innovators who sell ideas have random reservation prices, 
some entrepreneurs end up with too much liquidity and others end up with too little. 
This problem is mitigated by having an intermediary that channels funds across entre-
preneurs. 
Banking panics have been associated with price declines in both the United States 
and Japan. Fisher hypothesized that banking panics are a consequence of mismatches 
in bank balance sheets, where liabilities are nominal and assets are real. Because of this, 
a decrease in the price level raises the real value of existing nominal obligations but has 
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no effect on the real value of assets and, hence, decreases bank value. In “Banking and 
Intermediation,” Francesca Carapella develops a model to analyze this hypothesis. In 
the model banks play two roles: they lend to ﬁ  rms, and they contribute to the payment 
system by providing an alternative to outside money. If banks default, this alternative is 
lost and all purchases must be in cash. In this event, the demand for cash increases and, 
consequently, prices fall. Carapella shows that there exists an equilibrium that features 
lower prices when banking panics and defaults occur. The environment is suitable for 
analyzing policy similar to that suggested by Friedman and Schwartz, whose insight was 
that during the Depression looser monetary policy may have helped. 
In “Moneychangers and Commodity Money,” Vincent Bignon and Richard Dutu ad-
dress the issue of the imperfect recognizability in a commodity money system. They 
construct a model that has light and heavy metal coins, imperfect recognizability, and 
a technology that enables agents to have their coin assessed and certiﬁ  ed. They show 
that such a technology reduces the set of equilibria where heavy coins are not traded 
when they are not recognized as heavy, a version of Gresham’s law. Also, they show that 
Gresham’s law and certiﬁ  cation cannot coexist as equilibria. They show that welfare is 
higher when heavy coins are certiﬁ  ed. The technology also restricts the set of equilibria 
characterized by circulation of light and heavy coins trading at the same price when 
not recognized. However, circulation-by-tale survives for high discount rates. This kind 
of work not only aids our understanding of historical episodes, it also helps us to think 
about modern issues like the possibility or desirability of private monies. 
There are numerous historical episodes in which individuals complained about there 
being a shortage of small coins. The lack of small change appears to have caused the 
following problem. In order to complete a purchase, a buyer has to pay too much or 
forgo the transaction altogether. In “A Model of Small-Change Shortages,” Angela Redish 
and Warren Weber build a matching model with two indivisible commodity monies. 
This takes seriously the idea that monies are coins with different intrinsic values. Both 
the case in which the supplies of silver and gold available for coinage are ﬁ  xed and the 
case in which minting and melting are permitted are examined. For the case in which 
the supplies of the two metals are ﬁ  xed, there exist equilibria in which both monies are 
used for trades and the lower-valued money is used to make change in some transac-
tions. Increasing the supply of small coins can improve welfare. These ﬁ  ndings are con-
sistent with the historical complaints about small-change shortages, and, again, also help 
us to think about modern issues in monetary economic theory and policy. 
Self-regulatory organizations, or SROs, play an important role in the securities indus-
try. While self-regulation is viewed as having advantages over direct regulation, this view 
can be questioned. The incentive to self-regulate may be reduced as competition for 
listing and trading volume among organizations (exchanges) increases. In “Competition 
among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy,” Cecilia Caglio and Andrea Pescatori explore 
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this idea. They ask whether the presence of multiple for-proﬁ  t SROs results in lax self-
regulation as a means of attracting business, and what effect enforcement policy has on 
the division of rents. A costly-state-veriﬁ  cation model is developed where SROs compete 
by setting enforcement policy and transaction fees. Transactions are executed by bro-
kers, but investors do not observe cash ﬂ  ow, and brokers try to minimize payments by 
misreporting true ﬂ  ows. An investigation can occur when a transaction takes place, and 
the likelihood of a successful investigation depends upon the amount of resources in-
vested and the efﬁ  ciency of monitoring. If fraud is detected, the SRO imposes a penalty 
on the broker. It is shown that competition among for-proﬁ  t SROs generates a “race to 
the bottom” for enforcement, which ultimately reduces SRO proﬁ  ts and increases broker 
proﬁ  ts. 
Money and Bonds 
When agents face binding cash constraints, the introduction of illiquid bonds may im-
prove the monetary allocation. In “The Societal Beneﬁ  ts of Outside versus Inside Bonds,” 
Aleksander Berentsen and Christopher Waller study the case in which the allocations of 
illiquid outside bonds and inside bonds are different, and examine optimal policy. A mod-
el in the spirit of Lagos and Wright is constructed with money and bonds. Two economies 
are considered: one with illiquid government bonds and one with inside bonds. Consum-
ers receive preference shocks, which create differential needs for liquidity; after shocks 
occur but before goods markets open, they trade bonds and money. It is assumed that the 
government cannot run a deﬂ  ation since this requires lump-sum taxation. It implies that, 
with inside bonds, redemption must be voluntary. It is shown that for any positive inﬂ  a-
tion rate, bonds are essential in both economies. For sufﬁ  ciently high inﬂ  ation rates, the 
allocations in the two economies are the same, while they differ for low inﬂ  ation rates. 
The key result is that, under an optimal policy, the allocation with illiquid outside bonds 
dominates the allocation with inside bonds. 
In “Sustained Societal Beneﬁ  t of Illiquid Bonds,” Ling Sun also studies whether alloca-
tive efﬁ  ciency can be improved by introducing illiquid bonds. Households are heteroge-
neous, which creates a need for intratemporal consumption smoothing. Since consum-
ers and producers from the same households go to different locations to participate in 
market activities, money is essential to facilitate trade. When bonds are perfectly liquid, 
they are perfect substitutes for money and, hence, their rates of return are the same. 
The allocation in this case is not efﬁ  cient since marginal utilities of consumers are not 
equated. Introducing illiquid bonds enables households to engage in intratemporal con-
sumption sharing. Introducing illiquid bonds generates an improvement in efﬁ  ciency in 
two ways: by better allocating consumption goods among heterogeneous agents, and by 
stimulating output by loosening liquidity constraints. 
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Much of what passes for money in any well-developed economy is private debt. An 
almost universal property of private debt instruments is that they are collateralized by 
some form of capital. It would seem desirable to study environments in which capital 
can be used to collateralize private debt and collateralized debt can serve as a means of 
payment. The challenge would be to explain why .at money remains essential, and why 
agents make good on debt contracts. To this end, in “Money, Capital, and Collateral,” Da-
vid Andolfatto and Fernando Martin employ a simple assumption that agents can com-
mit to honor debt only up to some value related to their accumulated stock of capital. 
When constraints are slack, money is inessential. When collateral constraints bind, how-
ever, money expands the set of feasible trades. Away from the Friedman rule, both pri-
vate debt instruments and .at money are essential, with both assets earning an identical 
return. Hence, when collateral constraints bind, there is an insufﬁ  cient supply of private 
money. Collateral constraints become less important at lower rates of inﬂ  ation.
In “Collateral Secured Loans in a Monetary Economy,” Leo Ferraris and Makoto Wata-
nabe also present a model where anonymous agents use capital goods as a guarantee 
of repayment. The environment is a version of Lagos-Wright with a competitive credit 
market. Since monitoring or enforcement is unavailable, agents can obtain loans only by 
committing capital as collateral. Two situations can arise in equilibrium: one is where 
the borrowing constraint does not bind, and capital is at the ﬁ  rst-best level; the other is 
where the constraint binds, and capital is too high. The effect of inﬂ  ation on investment 
is determined by the marginal net beneﬁ  t of making a loan relative to that of money 
holdings. They show, for example, that capital accumulation is decreasing in the rate of 
inﬂ  ation if and only if relative risk aversion is below unity. 
In “Optimal Risk-Sharing without Commitment in a Model where Money and Collat-
eral are Essential,” David Mills and Robert Reed provide an environment in which col-
lateral arises endogenously, alongside money, to support trade. The new twist is that col-
lateral serves two roles: the ﬁ  rst is to provide incentives for borrowers to pay back loans; 
and the second is to provide insurance for lenders in the event that borrowers default. 
In order to have both roles, the environment adopts the following features. There are 
two types of agents, who differ in preferences, endowments, and investment technolo-
gies, motivating the need for credit. In order to capture the incentive role for collateral, 
agents cannot commit to future actions. A tension between two incentive constraints 
pins down the optimal amount of collateral, such that borrowers with the ability to re-
pay are just indifferent between defaulting or not, while lenders are indifferent between 
selling the collateral back and liquidating. 
In “On the Term Structure of Real Interest Rates and Inﬂ  ation: Empirical Evidence 
using Inﬂ  ation Forecasts,” Joseph Haubrich, George Pennacchi, and Peter Ritchken de-
velop and test a four-state-variable model of the dynamics of the term structure. The 
state variables correspond to a real interest rate, expected inﬂ  ation, inﬂ  ation volatility, 
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and a stochastic central tendency to which the inﬂ  ation rate reverts. Expected inﬂ  ation, 
its central tendency, and the real rate follow correlated mean-reverting processes whose 
volatilities are proportional to the volatility of inﬂ  ation. In turn, actual inﬂ  ation follows a 
correlated GARCH process. Analytical solutions for the term structure of nominal bond 
prices are developed. Analytical solutions for prices of inﬂ  ation-indexed bonds that have 
an indexation lag, such as U.S. Treasury Inﬂ  ation-Protected Securities, are derived. The 
model can use survey forecasts of inﬂ  ation, together with price indices and nominal 
bond yields, to establish a coherent model of the dynamics of the term structure. It also 
can be used to obtain estimates for real rates, for long rate changes, and so on, and is rich 
enough to price Treasury Inﬂ  ation-Protected Securities, including the indexation lag. POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 23, DECEMBER 2007
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